Risky Business: The Economic Risks of Climate Change in the United States by Kate Gordon
A CLIMATE RISK ASSESSMENT  
FOR THE UNITED STATES
June 2014
© 2014 Risky Business
RISKY BUSINESS: The Economic Risks of Climate Change in the United States 
A Product of the Risky Business Project:
Co-Chairs:
Michael R. Bloomberg, founder, Bloomberg Philanthropies; 108th Mayor of 
the City of New York; founder, Bloomberg L.P.
Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Chairman of the Paulson Institute; former U.S. 
Secretary of the Treasury
Thomas F. Steyer, retired founder, Farallon Capital Management LLC
Risk Committee Members:
Henry Cisneros, Founder and Chairman, CityView Capital; former U.S. Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); former Mayor of San Antonio
Gregory Page, Executive Chairman, Cargill, Inc. and former Cargill Chief 
Executive Officer
Robert E. Rubin, Co-Chairman, Council on Foreign Relations; former U.S. 
Secretary of the Treasury
George P. Shultz, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at 
the Hoover Institution; former U.S. Secretary of State; former U.S. Secretary 
of the Treasury; former U.S. Secretary of Labor; former Director, Office of 
Management and Budget; former President, Bechtel Group
Donna E. Shalala, President, University of Miami; former U.S. Secretary of 
Health and Human Services 
Olympia Snowe, former U.S. Senator representing Maine
Dr. Alfred Sommer, Dean Emeritus, Bloomberg School of Public Health; 
University Distinguished Service Professor, Johns Hopkins University
A CLIMATE RISK ASSESSMENT  




Lead Authors Kate Gordon, Executive Director of the 
Risky Business Project, drawing from independent 
research commissioned by the Risky Business Project. 
Special thanks to Matt Lewis, Risky Business Project 
Communications Director, and Jamesine Rogers, Risky 
Business Project Manager, for their editorial support.
Research  Risky Business Project co-chairs Michael R. 
Bloomberg, Henry Paulson, and Tom Steyer tasked 
the Rhodium Group, an economic research firm that 
specializes in analyzing disruptive global trends, with an 
independent assessment of the economic risks posed 
by a changing climate in the U.S. Rhodium convened 
a research team co-led by Dr. Robert Kopp of Rutgers 
University and economist Dr. Solomon Hsiang of the 
University of California, Berkeley. Rhodium also part-
nered with Risk Management Solutions (RMS), the world’s 
largest catastrophe-modeling company for insurance, 
reinsurance, and investment-management companies 
around the world. The team leveraged recent advances 
in climate modeling, econometric research, private sector 
risk assessment, and scalable cloud computing (pro-
cessing over 20 terabytes of climate and economic data) 
to provide decision-makers with empirically-grounded 
and spatially-explicit information about the climate risks 
they face. The team’s complete assessment, along with 
technical appendices, is available at Rhodium’s website, 
climateprospectus.rhg.com. Interactive maps and other 
content associated with the Risky Business Project are 
located at riskybusiness.org. 
The research team’s work was reviewed by an indepen-
dent Risky Business Expert Review Panel composed of 
leading climate scientists and economists. A full list of the 
expert review panel is available on Rhodium’s website.
Funding  This report would not have been  
possible without the financial support of Bloomberg 
Philanthropies, the Office of Hank Paulson, the 
Rockefeller Family Fund, the Skoll Global Threats Fund, 
and the TomKat Charitable Trust.
01
Executive Summary Great Plains
Introduction Northwest
Understanding Climate Risk Southwest





From Risk Assessment to 


















The U.S. faces significant and diverse economic risks 
from climate change. The signature effects of human-in-
duced climate change—rising seas, increased damage 
from storm surge, more frequent bouts of extreme 
heat—all have specific, measurable impacts on our 
nation’s current assets and ongoing economic activity. 
To date, there has been no comprehensive assessment 
of the economic risks our nation faces from the changing 
climate. Risky Business: The Economic Risks of Climate 
Change to the United States uses a standard risk-assess-
ment approach to determine the range of potential 
consequences for each region of the U.S.—as well as for 
selected sectors of the economy—if we continue on our 
current path. The Risky Business research focused on the 
clearest and most economically significant of these risks: 
Damage to coastal property and infrastructure from 
rising sea levels and increased storm surge, cli-
mate-driven changes in agricultural production and 
energy demand, and the impact of higher tempera-
tures on labor productivity and public health.
Our research combines peer-reviewed climate science 
projections through the year 2100 with empirically-de-
rived estimates of the impact of projected changes 
in temperature, precipitation, sea levels, and storm 
activity on the U.S. economy. We analyze not only those 
outcomes most likely to occur, but also lower-probability 
“
”
Damages from storms, flooding, and heat waves are already costing local economies 
billions of dollars—we saw that firsthand in New York City with Hurricane Sandy. With 
the oceans rising and the climate changing, the Risky Business report details the costs 
of inaction in ways that are easy to understand in dollars and cents—and impossible 
to ignore.
— Risky Business Project Co-Chair Michael R. Bloomberg 1 
3high-cost climate futures. Unlike any other study to date, 
we also provide geographic granularity for the impacts we 
quantify, in some cases providing county-level results. 
Our findings show that, if we continue on our current path, 
many regions of the U.S. face the prospect of serious eco-
nomic effects from climate change. However, if we choose 
a different path—if we act aggressively to both adapt to 
the changing climate and to mitigate future impacts by 
reducing carbon emissions—we can significantly reduce 
our exposure to the worst economic risks from climate 
change, and also demonstrate global leadership on climate.
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FPO / IMAGE HERE
The American economy is already beginning to feel 
the effects of climate change. These impacts will 
likely grow materially over the next 5 to 25 years and 
affect the future performance of today’s business 
and investment decisions in the following areas:
Coastal property and infrastructure. Within the 
next 15 years, higher sea levels combined with storm 
surge will likely increase the average annual cost of 
coastal storms along the Eastern Seaboard and the 
Gulf of Mexico by $2 billion to $3.5 billion. Adding in 
potential changes in hurricane activity, the likely 
increase in average annual losses grows to up to $7.3 
billion, bringing the total annual price tag for hurri-
canes and other coastal storms to $35 billion.
Agriculture. A defining characteristic of agriculture 
in the U.S. is its ability to adapt. But the adaptation 
SHORT-TERM CLIMATE THREATS  
challenge going forward for certain farmers in 
specific counties in the Midwest and South will be 
significant. Without adaptation, some Midwestern 
and Southern counties could see a decline in yields 
of more than 10% over the next 5 to 25 years should 
they continue to sow corn, wheat, soy and cotton, 
with a 1-in-20 chance of yield losses of these crops of 
more than 20%.     
Energy. Greenhouse gas-driven changes in tempera-
ture will likely necessitate the construction of up to 
95 gigawatts of new power generation capacity over 
the next 5 to 25 years—the equivalent of roughly 200 
average coal or natural gas-fired power plants—cost-
ing residential and commercial ratepayers up to $12 
billion per year. 
Climate Change: Nature’s Interest-Only Loan
Our research focuses on climate impacts from today out 
to the year 2100, which may seem far off to many inves-
tors and policymakers. But climate impacts are unusual 
in that future risks are directly tied to present decisions. 
Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases can stay 
in the atmosphere for hundreds or even thousands 
of years. Higher concentrations of these gases create 
a “greenhouse effect” and lead to higher temperatures, 
higher sea levels, and shifts in global weather patterns. 
The effects are cumulative: By not acting to lower 
4»» Property losses from sea level rise are concentrated 
in specific regions of the U.S., especially on the 
Southeast and Atlantic coasts, where the rise is higher 
and the losses far greater than the national average. 
• Extreme heat across the nation—especially in the 
Southwest, Southeast, and Upper Midwest—threat-
ening labor productivity, human health, and energy 
systems
»» By the middle of this century, the average American 
will likely see 27 to 50 days over 95°F each year—two 
to more than three times the average annual number 
of 95°F days we’ve seen over the past 30  years. By 
the end of this century, this number will likely reach 
45 to 96 days over 95°F each year on average. 
»» As with sea level rise, these national averages mask 
regional extremes, especially in the Southwest, 
Southeast, and upper Midwest, which will likely see 
several months of 95°F days each year.
»» Labor productivity of outdoor workers, such as 
those working in construction, utility maintenance, 
landscaping, and agriculture, could be reduced by 
as much as 3%, particularly in the Southeast. For 
context, labor productivity across the entire U.S. 
labor force declined about 1.5% during the famous 
“productivity slowdown” in the 1970s.3
»» Over the longer term, during portions of the year, 
extreme heat could surpass the threshold at which 
the human body can no longer maintain a normal 
core temperature without air conditioning, which we 
measure using a “Humid Heat Stroke Index” (HHSI). 
During these periods, anyone whose job requires 
them to work outdoors, as well as anyone lacking 
greenhouse gas emissions today, decision-makers put 
in place processes that increase overall risks tomorrow, 
and each year those decision-makers fail to act serves to 
broaden and deepen those risks. In some ways, climate 
change is like an interest-only loan we are putting on the 
backs of future generations: They will be stuck paying off  
the cumulative interest on the greenhouse gas emissions 
we’re putting into the atmosphere now, with no possibili-
ty of actually paying down that “emissions principal.”
Our key findings underscore the reality that if we stay 
on our current emissions path, our climate risks will 
multiply and accumulate as the decades tick by. These 
risks include:
• Large-scale losses of coastal property and  
infrastructure
»» If we continue on our current path, by 2050 between 
$66 billion and $106 billion worth of existing coastal 
property will likely be below sea level nationwide, 
with $238 billion to $507 billion worth of property 
below sea level by 2100. 
»» There is a 1-in-20 chance—about the same chance 
as an American developing colon cancer; twice as 
likely as an American developing melanoma
2
—that 
by the end of this century, more than $701 billion 
worth of existing coastal property will be below 
mean sea levels, with more than $730 billion of 
additional property at risk during high tide. By the 
same measure of probability, average annual losses 
from hurricanes and other coastal storms along the 
Eastern Seaboard and the Gulf of Mexico will grow 
by more than $42 billion due to sea level rise alone. 
Potential changes in hurricane activity could raise this 
figure to $108 billion. 
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5access to air conditioning, will face severe health risks 
and potential death.
»» Demand for electricity for air conditioning will surge 
in those parts of the country facing the most extreme 
temperature increases, straining regional generation 
and transmission capacity and driving up costs for 
consumers.
• Shifting agricultural patterns and crop yields, with 
likely gains for Northern farmers offset by losses in 
the Midwest and South
»» As extreme heat spreads across the middle of the 
country by the end of the century, some states in the 
Southeast, lower Great Plains, and Midwest risk up 
to a 50% to 70% loss in average annual crop yields 
(corn, soy, cotton, and wheat), absent agricultural 
adaptation.
»» At the same time, warmer temperatures and carbon 
fertilization may improve agricultural productivity 
and crop yields in the upper Great Plains and other 
northern states.
»» Food systems are resilient at a national and global 
level, and agricultural producers have proven them-
selves extremely able to adapt to changing climate 
conditions. These shifts, however, still carry risks for 
the individual farming communities most vulnerable 
to projected climatic changes.  
The Risky Business Project is designed to highlight 
climate risks to specific business sectors and regions of 
the economy, and to provide actionable data at a geo-
graphically granular level for decision-makers. It is our 
hope that it becomes standard practice for the American 
business and investment community to factor climate 
change into its decision-making process. We are already 
seeing this response from the agricultural and national 
security sectors; we are starting to see it from the bond 
markets and utilities as well. But business still tends to 
respond only to the extent that these risks intersect with 
core short term financial and planning decisions.
We also know that the private sector does not operate 
in a vacuum, and that the economy runs most smoothly 
when government sets a consistent policy and a regula-
tory framework within which business has the freedom 
to operate. Right now, cities and businesses are scram-
bling to adapt to a changing climate without sufficient 
federal government support, resulting in a virtual “un-
funded mandate by omission” to deal with climate at the 
local level.4 We believe that American businesses should 
play an active role in helping the public sector determine 
how best to react to the risks and costs posed by climate 
change, and how to set the rules that move the country 
forward in a new, more sustainable direction. 
With this report, we call on the American business 
community to rise to the challenge and lead the way 
in helping reduce climate risks. We hope the Risky 
Business Project will facilitate this action by providing 
critical information about how climate change may affect 
key sectors and regions of our national economy. 
This is only a first step, but it’s a step toward getting 
America on a new path leading to a more secure, more 
certain economic future.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
6 New York Stock Exchange underwater after Hurricane Sandy
7INTRODUCTION
Americans understand risk. Our ability to evaluate 
risk—to take calculated plunges into new ventures and 
economic directions and to innovate constantly to bring 
down those risks—has contributed immensely to the 
nation’s preeminence in the global economy. From the 
private sector’s pioneering venture-capital financing 
model to the government’s willingness to invest in 
early-stage inventions like the computer chip or the 
solar panel, our nation’s ability to identify and manage 
potential risks has moved the economy forward in 
exciting and profitable directions.
The Risky Business Project is designed to apply risk as-
sessment to the critical issue of climate change, and to 
take a sober, fact-based look at the potential risks facing 
specific sectors and regions of the national economy. As 
in a classic business risk assessment, we analyzed not 
only the most likely scenarios, but also the scenarios that, 
while less likely, could have more significant impacts. 
Our conclusion: The American economy faces multi-
ple and significant risks from climate change. Climate 
conditions vary dramatically across the U.S., as does 
the mix of economic activity. Those variations will 
benefit our economic resilience to future climatic 
changes. But each region of the country has a differ-
ent risk profile and a different ability to manage that 
risk. There is no single top-line number that rep-
resents the cost of climate change to the American 
economy as a whole: We must take a regional 
approach to fully understand our climate risk. 
Given the range and extent of the climate risks the 
American economy faces, it is clear that staying on our 
current path will only increase our exposure. The U.S. 
climate is paying the price today for business decisions 
made many years ago, especially through increased coast-
al storm damage and more extreme heat in parts of the 
country. Every year that goes by without a comprehensive 
public and private sector response to climate change is 
a year that locks in future climate events that will have 
a far more devastating effect on our local, regional, and 
national economies. Moreover, both government and the 
private sector are making investment decisions today—
whether in property, long-term infrastructure or regional 
and national supply chains—that will be directly affected 
by climate change in decades to come. 
Our assessment finds that, if we act now, the U.S. can still 
avoid most of the worst impacts and significantly reduce 
the odds of costly climate outcomes—but only if we start 
changing our business and public policy practices today.
The Risky Business Project does not dictate the solutions 
to climate change; while we fully believe the U.S. can 
respond to these risks through climate preparedness and 
mitigation, we do not argue for a specific set or combi-
nation of these policies. Rather, we document the risks 
and leave it to decision-makers in the business and policy 
communities to determine their own tolerance for, and 
specific reactions to, those risks.
Road washed away by extreme flood in Jamestown, Colorado
8A couple is rescued from their home on Galveston Island, Texas, after a hurricane
9In order to know how to best respond to climate change, 
we first need to fully understand the risks it presents. 
This is our core principle. As Risky Business Project Co-
Chair Michael Bloomberg observes, “If you can’t measure 
it, you can’t manage it.” 6
“ ”
I know a lot about financial risks—in fact, I spent nearly my whole career managing 
risks and dealing with financial crisis. Today I see another type of crisis looming: A 
climate crisis. And while not financial in nature, it threatens our economy just the same.
— Risky Business Project Co-Chair Henry Paulson 5
FPO / IMAGE HERE
The risk of a future event can be described as the 
probability (or likelihood) of that event combined 
with the severity of its consequences. The combina-
tion of likelihood and severity determines whether 
a risk is high or low. For instance, a highly likely 
event with minimal consequences would register 
as a moderate risk; a low probability event, if it has 
potentially catastrophic impacts, could constitute a 
significant risk. These low-probability/high-impact 
risks are generally referred to as “tail risks.” 
The Risky Business assessment evaluates a range 
of economic risks presented by climate change in 
the U.S., including both those outcomes considered 
most likely to occur and lower probability climate 
DEFINING RISK
futures that would be either considerably better or 
considerably worse than the likely range. This is a 
common risk assessment approach in other areas 
with potentially catastrophic outcomes, including di-
saster management, public health, defense planning, 
and terrorism prevention. 
In presenting our results we use the term “likely” 
to describe outcomes with at least a 67% (or 2-in-3) 
chance of occurring. In discussing tail risks, we gen-
erally describe results as having a 1-in-20 chance (or 
5%) of being worse than (or better than) a particular 
threshold. Where the science allows it, we also de-
scribe 1-in-100 outcomes, or those with a 1% chance 
of occurring.
Assessing and managing risk is how businesses, mili-
taries and governments are able to remain productive 
and successful in an increasingly complex, volatile, and 




The risk approach is well suited to the issue of climate 
change. Even the single term “climate change” is short-
hand for a diverse array of impacts, mostly stemming 
from increased heat in the atmosphere and oceans, but 
also radiating outward in myriad and geographically 
diverse ways. For example, in some regions sea levels will 
likely rise, while in others they may actually fall. In some 
areas we will likely see increased droughts, whereas in 
others the combination of heat and humidity could lead 
to physically unbearable outdoor conditions, with in-
creased risk of heat stroke for the many Americans who 
work outdoors in sectors such as construction, utility 
maintenance, transportation, and agriculture. 
Moreover, all these conditions can and will change based 
on the actions we take today and into the future, as 
well as on unknowable factors such as the precise rate 
of Arctic and Antarctic ice melt. Thus the “change” part 
of climate change is the crux of the matter: To plan 
for climate change, we must plan for volatility and 
disruption.7
Risk assessment gives businesses a way to plan for 
change. From PricewaterhouseCoopers’s 2008 primer, “A 
Practical Guide to Risk Assessment”:
The ability to identify, assess, and manage risk 
is often indicative of an organization’s ability to 
respond and adapt to change. Risk assessment 
. . . helps organizations to quickly recognize  
potential adverse events, be more proactive 
and forward-looking, and establish appropriate 
risk responses, thereby reducing surprises and 
the costs or losses associated with business 
disruptions. This is where risk assessment’s real 
value lies: in preventing or minimizing negative 
surprises and unearthing new opportunities.
8
The Risky Business Project examines the risks of the U.S. 
continuing on its current path, or “business as usual.” This 
assumes no new national policy or global action to mitigate 
climate change and an absence of investments aimed at 
improving our resilience to future climate impacts. Taking 
these policy and adaptive actions could significantly reduce 
the risks we face, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Our research analyzes the risks of “business as usual” 
to specific critical sectors of the economy and regions 
of the country. We focus in particular on sectors that 
are already making large, expensive investments in 
Figure 1: Global Emissions Scenarios
Our research examines the risks of the U.S. continuing on its 
current path, or “business as usual.” Alternate pathways that 
include investments in adaptation or policy efforts to mitigate 
climate change through lowering carbon emissions could  
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fire, that they deem unacceptable. The military plans for 
a wide range of possible (and sometimes highly unlikely) 
conflict scenarios, and public health officials prepare for 
pandemics of low or unknown probability. 
When looking at climate change, it’s particularly import-
ant to consider the outlier events and not just the most 
likely scenarios. Indeed, the “outlier” 1-in-100 year event 
today will become the 1-in-10 year event as the Earth 
continues to warm. Put another way, over time the 
extremes will become the “new normal.”
infrastructure that will likely last well into the future: 
agriculture, energy, and coastal infrastructure. We 
also look at the impact of climate change on America’s 
labor productivity and public health, which influence 
multiple economic sectors. These latter impacts also are 
deeply connected to our shared future quality of life. 
As with any risk assessment, our investigation looks at not 
only the most likely outcomes, but also climate futures 
that have a lower probability of occurring but particularly 
severe consequences should they come to pass. (See 
“Defining Risk” sidebar, p. 9.) This focus on “tail risks” is not 
unique to climate change. After all, households and busi-
nesses pay a premium for insurance to protect themselves 
against those tail risks, such as the possibility of flood or 
UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE RISK
Human society is structured around “normal” weather, with some days hotter than average and some colder. At the distant “tails” are 
extreme events such as catastrophic weather. Climate change shifts the entire distribution curve to the right. Old extremes become the 
new normal, new extremes emerge, and the process continues until we take action.




“Risk is like fire: If controlled it will help you; if 
uncontrolled it will rise up and destroy you.” 
— Theodore Roosevelt 
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Our risk assessment begins with the straightforward 
fact that human-induced climate change leads to rising 
temperatures. 
If we continue along our current path, with no significant 
efforts to curb climate change, the U.S. will likely see sig-
nificantly more days above 95°F each year. By the middle 
of this century, the average American will likely see 26 
to 50 days over 95°F each year—from double to more 
than triple the average number of 95°F days we’ve seen 
over the past 30 to 40 years. Climate change impacts only 
accelerate with time, so that by the end of this century 
we will likely see 45 to 96 days per year over 95°F. That’s 
between one and a half and three months of the year at 
what are now considered record hot temperatures. To 
put this in context, by the end of the century, Oregon, 
Washington, and Idaho could well have more days above 
95°F each year than there are currently in Texas. 
These are only the most likely scenarios; there are possible 
lower and higher estimates outside the most likely range. 
Within that range, there are also disparities, of course: As 
the maps that follow demonstrate, some regions of the 
country will be far harder hit by extreme heat than others, 
and some will experience rising temperatures in terms of 
warmer winters rather than unbearable summers. 
What matters isn’t just the heat, it’s the humidity—or, in 
this case, a dangerous combination of the two. One of 
the most striking findings in our analysis is that increas-
ing heat and humidity in some parts of the country could 
lead to outside conditions that are literally unbearable to 
humans, who must maintain a skin temperature below 
95°F in order to effectively cool down and avoid fatal heat 
stroke. The U.S. has never yet seen a day exceeding this 
threshold on what we call the “Humid Heat Stroke Index,” 
but if we continue on our current climate path, this will 
change, with residents in the eastern half of the U.S. ex-
periencing 1 such day a year on average by century’s end 
and nearly 13 such days per year into the next century.
“ ”
Talking about climate change in terms of U.S. averages is like saying, ‘My head is in  
the refrigerator, and my feet are in the oven, so overall I’m average.’ 
— Risky Business Project Co-Chair Tom Steyer 9 
RESULTS: 
RISKS VARY BY REGION & SECTOR
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RESULTS: RISKS VARY BY REGION & SECTOR
Figure 3: Average Days Over 95°F: Projections Mapped Over a Lifetime
On our current path, the U.S. will likely see significantly 
more days above 95°F each year. Some regions of the 
country will be hit far harder by extreme heat than 
others, and some will experience rising temperatures 
Heat Map Key:
Average Days Per Year Over 95°F
in terms of warmer winters rather than unbearable 
summers. But by the end of this century, the average 
American will likely see 45 to 96 days per year over 95°F. 
0 10 20 35 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 250
Data Source: Rhodium Group
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RESULTS: RISKS VARY BY REGION & SECTOR
By the end of the century, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho could well 
have more days above 95°F each year than there are currently in 
Texas; babies being born right now in the Southwest could see nearly 




Rising seas and greater coastal storm damage 
already threaten the financial value and viability 
of many properties and infrastructure along 
the Eastern Seaboard and Gulf Coast. If we stay on our 
current climate path, some homes and commercial prop-
erties with 30-year mortgages in places in Virginia, North 
Carolina, New Jersey, Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana 
and elsewhere could quite literally be underwater before 
the note is paid off.
Rising temperatures will also reduce labor 
productivity, as some regions—especially the 
Southeast and Southwest—become too hot by 
mid-century for people to work outside during parts of 
the day. 
Heat will also put strains on our energy system, 
simultaneously decreasing system efficiency 
and performance as system operators struggle 
to cool down facilities, and increasing electricity con-
sumption and costs due to a surge in demand for air 
conditioning.
As parts of the nation heat up, the worst health 
impacts will be felt among the poor—many 
of whom work or even live outdoors or can’t 
afford air conditioning at home—and among those too 
elderly or frail to physically withstand the heat or get 
themselves to air-conditioned facilities. 
More than any other factor, our direct economic expo-
sure to climate change will be determined by where we 
do business. For that reason, we present our findings 
below in terms of the major regions of the U.S., and then 
identify how climate change will affect critical sectors 
within those regions. Still, as any business person knows, 
these impacts won’t be contained within regional bound-
aries; the ripple effects are likely to resonate throughout 
the economy. Put another way, just because it’s not hot 
where you are doesn’t mean you won’t feel the heat of 
climate change.
RESULTS: RISKS VARY BY REGION & SECTOR
Heat is a critical issue for the health of businesses as well 
as that of human beings. On their own, rising tempera-
tures can have significant negative impacts on health and 
also labor productivity. But high temperatures are also at 
the root of several other important climate impacts that 
have long been recognized by scientists: 
• Hotter air on the Earth’s surface leads to higher ocean 
temperatures, which causes ocean expansion and sea 
level rise; 
•  Higher temperatures accelerate the rates at which land 
ice melts, further elevating average sea levels;
• A warmer atmosphere makes extreme precipitation 
more likely, which is expected to make wet regions even 
wetter, but could also make dry regions even drier.
Because the U.S. is such a large and geographically 
diverse country, it will experience every one of these 
climate impacts in the next century. Even the individual 
sectors we studied have regional variations: For agricul-
ture, for instance, the national story is one of an industry 
able to adapt by changing where and what farmers plant; 
at the same time, the story within particular regions is 
quite different, as individual farmers potentially aban-
don traditional crops or move away from the farming 
business altogether. For the energy industry, the story 
in the warming North is starkly different than in the 
increasingly unbearably hot South. Sea levels, too, vary 
significantly across the U.S., and even across cities along 
the same coastline: For example, sea level rise at New 
York will likely be higher than at Boston, and sea level rise 
at San Diego will likely be higher than at San Francisco.
As in a standard business risk assessment, we looked at 
the data to see exactly where the greatest risks lie, and 
confirmed that some regions and economic sectors face  
extreme and unacceptable risks. These are some of our 
gravest concerns:
18 Man wades through floodwaters in Immokalee, Florida, after Hurricane Wilma
THE REGIONS
The Risky Business analysis builds on the research 
and analytical work done over the past several decades 
by international climate scientists and economists, 
including the recent National Climate Assessment (NCA), 
released in early May 2014. The Risky Business Project 
takes as our unit of measurement the National Climate 
Assessment regions, which are organized loosely around 
shared geologic characteristics and climate impacts.10 
These are: Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, 
Great Plains, Northwest, Alaska, and Hawaii. 
However, we went even deeper than the NCA, conducting 
analysis down to the county level in some cases, and also 
focusing on key economic sectors. We overlaid our re-
gional climate impact findings with an economic analysis 
showing the potential cost of these impacts within those 
regions and sectors. Below, we explore the most striking 
findings from each region. We encourage readers to go 
to riskybusiness.org to explore these regional impacts in 
more depth and to climateprospectus.rhg.com for the 
independent research team’s complete risk assessment.
 
 
In a country as large and diverse as the U.S., it does 
not make sense to aggregate the highly localized eco-
nomic impacts of climate change into one headline 
number. Take the case of Hurricane Katrina: In the 
last quarter of 2005, every state in the nation pros-
pered except the state of Louisiana, which lost 1.6% 
of Gross State Product (GSP) as businesses were shut-
tered and workers stayed home; 11 meanwhile the 
following year, storm recovery activities in Louisiana 
(e.g., construction) actually increased the national 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by half a percent.12 
Indeed, most economic successes and disasters in 
the U.S. happen at the individual metropolitan, state, 
and occasionally multi-state level. 
Regions also have a cultural dimension: Americans 
often think of themselves as “belonging” to specific 
regions, according to Joel Garreau’s famous 1981 
book The Nine Nations of North America. Garreau pos-
its that Americans live in nine completely different 
cultural and economic zones. He writes: “Each has 
a peculiar economy; each commands a certain emo-
tional allegiance from its citizens. These nations look 
different, feel different, and sound different from each 
other, and few of their boundaries match the political 
lines drawn on current maps.” 13 Garreau’s obser-
vations underscore the fact that as mobile as many 
Americans are, we’re still often unwilling or unable 
to move out of our home regions simply because of 
weather or economic changes. 
The regional nature of climate impacts and the re-
gional nature of the overall American economy and 
cultural identity mean that there may not be one 
single national response to the risks highlighted by the 
Risky Business Project. But the reality of these impacts, 
especially in the Southwest and Southeast—which will 
likely experience the most extreme heat and sea level 
rise over this century—may also mean that Americans 
have no choice but to migrate to cooler and more 
livable areas, disrupting lives, livelihoods, and regional 




While the Northeast region of the U.S. is 
expected to experience a sizeable increase 
in temperatures and average number of 
extremely hot days over the course of the 
century, the region’s major climate impact 
will be sea level rise and its effect on 
coastal infrastructure. 
Rising sea levels are a direct consequence of rising 
temperatures: As the oceans warm, they expand. This 
phenomenon is further exacerbated by land-ice melt, 
particularly the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets. 
Scientists have recently found evidence of accelerat-
ing and perhaps unstoppable land ice melt in West 
Antarctica.14 A further (and more minor) contributor 
to sea level rise is groundwater withdrawal, which can 
literally sink the land adjacent to the ocean. All of these 
factors—thermal expansion, ice melt, and groundwater 
withdrawal—can lead to higher water levels along the 
coasts.
Why do sea levels matter to the American economy? First 
and foremost, sea level rise threatens the communities 
and industries along our coastlines. The coasts are critical 
to the Northeast region’s economy: Its major cities are 
on the water, as are many of its major industries, from 
New York’s Wall Street to the fisheries in Portland, Maine. 
All told, 88% of the population of this region lives in 
coastal counties, and 68% of the region’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is generated in those counties. As a result, 
much of the region’s residential, commercial, and energy 
infrastructure is also at or near sea level, making these 
assets particularly vulnerable to climate impacts. 
The Risky Business analysis shows that if we continue on 
our current path, sea levels at New York City will likely 
rise by an additional 0.9 feet to 1.6 feet by mid-century, 
and between 2.1 feet and 4.2 feet by the end of the 
century. Because our risk assessment includes less likely 
but higher-impact possibilities, we also found a 1-in-100 
chance that New York City could experience up to 6.8 
feet of sea level rise by the end of the century. The story 
for New Jersey is even more concerning because of that 
state’s groundwater withdrawal: It’s likely that, on our 
current path, Atlantic City will see 2.4 feet to 4.5 feet of sea 
Homeowners look over damage from New York City storm 
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NORTHEAST
NORTHEAST: AVERAGE SUMMER TEMPERATURE BY 2100 & KEY IMPACTS
Sea Level Rise: Sea level rise threatens the 
Northeast’s major cities, many of which 
are on the water, as are many of its major 
industries. 88% of the population of this region lives in 
coastal counties, and 68% of the region’s Gross Domes-
tic Product is generated in those counties.
Storm Surge: Higher sea levels can expand 
the reach of storm-related flooding and make 
storms more damaging. On our current path, 
additional projected sea level rise will likely increase average 
annual property losses from hurricanes and other coastal 
storms for the region by $6 billion to $9 billion by 2100.
Heat : Increased heat will be especially severe in cities and 
metro regions with more than 1 million people, where the 
high concentration of concrete and lack of natural cooling 
systems like streams and forests create an “urban heat island” effect that 
can raise average temperatures by as much as 5.4°F during the day and 
22°F in the evening over the surrounding rural areas.1009589 92 11086838077747050
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level rise by end of this century. North of New York City, the 
rise is slightly smaller: Boston will likely experience 2 feet to 
4 feet by 2100, and Portland is likely to experience a rise of 
1.7 feet to 3.8 feet in the same period.
Just looking at the simple rise in sea levels masks the 
impact these higher levels can have during a major storm. 
Sea level rise that had already occurred over the past 
century exacerbated storm surge during Hurricane Sandy, 
expanding the reach of the storm-related flooding and 
making the storm more costly. Our research shows that, if 
we continue on our current path, additional projected sea 
NORTHEAST
level rise will likely increase average annual property losses 
from hurricanes and other coastal storms by $6 billion to 
$9 billion over the course of the century. Potential changes 
in hurricane activity, also caused by atmospheric warming, 
would raise these estimates to $11 billion to $17 billion— 
a 2-to-3-fold increase from current levels.
The Northeast will also suffer from increased heat, 
especially because so many of the region’s residents 
live in cities that have higher temperatures due to the 
so-called “heat island effect.” In cities and metro regions 
with more than 1 million people, the high concentration 
of concrete and lack of natural cooling systems like 
streams and forests can raise average temperatures by 
as much as 5.4°F during the day and 22°F in the evening 
over the surrounding rural areas. 15
Figure 4: Expected Flooding From a 1-in-100 Year Storm
New York City
Current expected flooding from 1-in-100 year storm
Increase by 2030 Increase by 2050 Increase by 2100
Source: Risk Management Soultions (RMS)
23
Right now, the Northeast is actually rather temperate in 
the summer, with only 2.6 days over 95°F on average each 
year—a temperature we refer to throughout our research 
as “extremely hot.” By mid-century, the average resident in 
the Northeast will likely see between 4.7 and 16 additional 
extremely hot days; by late century this range will likely 
jump to between 17 and 59 additional extremely hot 
days, or up to two additional months of extreme heat. As 
we discuss further in the Southeast section below, these 
increasingly hot summers will have serious negative effects 
on health, mortality, and labor productivity. 
NORTHEAST
A man tries to cool down during a Philadelphia heat wave 
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of the century. There is a 1-in-20 chance that more than 
$346 billion in current Florida property will be underwa-
ter by the end of this century, and a 1-in-100 chance that 
more than $681 billion in property will be below mean 
sea levels. An additional $240 billion in property will likely 
be at risk during high tide that is not at risk today.
As in the Northeast, greater flooding during hurricanes 
and other coastal storms, plus potential changes in hur-
ricane activity, pose even greater and more immediate 
economic risks than mean sea level rise.
The Southeast will also likely be hit hardest by heat 
impacts. Over the past 30 years, the average resident of 
this region has experienced about 8 days per year at 95°F 
SOUTHEAST
Like the Northeast, the Southeastern U.S. 
has many coastal communities, though 
in this region only 36% of residents live in 
coastal counties, with 33% of GDP coming 
from those counties. 
However, sea level rise could seriously threaten the 
Southeast’s coastal infrastructure, given that some 
of the regions major cities (e.g., New Orleans) are at or 
below sea level while others (e.g., Miami) are built on 
porous limestone that allows water inundation even in the 
presence of a sea wall. Much of the region’s critical infra-
structure—including roads, rails, ports, airports, and oil and 
gas facilities—also sits at low elevations. 
Our research shows a significant risk to this region from 
sea level rise. On our current path, by mid-century, 
mean sea level at Norfolk, Virginia—home to the nation’s 
largest naval base—will likely rise between 1.1 feet and 
1.7 feet, and will rise 2.5 feet to 4.4 feet by the end of 
century. However, there is a 1-in-100 chance that Norfolk 
could see sea level rise of up to 6.5 feet by the end of the 
century (Figure 7).
In Florida, because of the porous limestone on which the 
major southern cities are built, even modest sea level rise 
comes at a significant economic cost. Under current pro-
jections, between $15 billion and $23 billion of existing 
property will likely be underwater by 2050, a number that 
grows to between $53 billion and $208 billion by the end 
A resident kayaks down a flooded street of Norfolk, Va. 
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Heat-Related Mortality: Heat-related mortality will 
likely cause 15 to 21 additional deaths per 100,000 
people each year in this region over the course of 
the century, with urban residents at greater risk due to the “heat 
island effect.” At current population levels, that translates into 
11,000 to 36,000 additional deaths per year.
Storm Surge: Increased 
flooding during hurri-
canes and other coastal 
storms poses even greater and more 
immediate economic risk than mean 
sea level rise to cities like Norfolk, 
which could see sea level rise of up to 
6.5 feet by the end of the century.
SOUTHEAST
SOUTHEAST: AVERAGE SUMMER TEMPERATURE BY 2100 & KEY IMPACTS
Labor Productivity: On our current emissions path, the 
average Southeast resident will likely experience one and a 
half to four additional months of extreme heat each year by 
2100. Our research shows that extreme heat will likely lead to a decrease 
in labor productivity in high-risk sectors like construction, mining, utilities, 
transportation, agriculture, and manufacturing.
Sea Level Rise: Sea level 
rise could seriously threat-
en Southeast coastal 
infrastructure given that some of the 
region’s major cities are at or below sea 
level, while others are built on porous 
limestone that allows water inundation 
even in the presence of a sea wall. 
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four additional months of extreme heat each year. 
This kind of weather could have serious economic 
impacts: Our research shows a decrease in labor pro-
ductivity in high-risk sectors like construction, mining, 
utilities, transportation, agriculture and manufacturing of 
up to 3.2% by the end of the century in this region, and a 
smaller but still noticeable impact on labor productivity in 
low-risk sectors like retail trade and professional services.
We are also likely to see an additional 15 to 21 deaths per 
100,000 people every year in this region over the course of 
the century due to increases in heat-related mortality, 
with urban residents at greater risk due to the heat island 
effect. At the current population of the Southeast, that 
translates into 11,000 to 36,000 additional deaths per year. 
or above. Looking forward, if we continue on our current 
emissions path, the average Southeast resident will likely 
experience an additional 17 to 52 extremely hot days per 
year by mid-century and an additional 48 to 130 days per 
year by the end of the century. That’s one and a half to 
SOUTHEAST






If these [impacts] occur in rural areas you’re particularly 
in trouble.”16 He goes on to note that in Chicago during 
the 1995 heat wave, local officials “didn’t even have a 
place to properly store [bodies from] the 700 deaths . . . 
that occurred over a small number of days.” 17
As Risk Committee member Dr. Alfred Sommer has 
pointed out, extreme heat will have a major impact on 
the capacity of local hospitals: “We just don’t have the 
surge capacity left in the medical system anymore. . . .  
SOUTHEAST
Figure 8: Value of State Property Below Mean Sea Level
Current Property Value Below Mean Sea Level by 2050, billion USD Current Property Value Below Mean Sea Level by 2100, billion USD
Data Source: Rhodium Group
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The upper Midwest economy is 
dominated by commodity agriculture, 
with some of the most intensive corn, 
soybean, and wheat growing in the world. 
Overall, the agricultural industry in this region includes 
more than 520,000 farms valued at $135.6 billion per 
year as of 2012, and the region accounts for 65% of 
national production of corn and soybeans alone.18 For 
the Midwest, commodity agriculture is a crucial busi-
ness, and the health and productivity of the agricultural 
sector is inextricably intertwined with climate condi-
tions. Our research shows that under the “business as 
usual” scenario and assuming no significant adaptation 
by farmers, some states in the region, like Missouri and 
Illinois, face up to a 15% likely average yield loss in the 
next 5 to 25 years, and up to a 73% likely average yield 
loss by the end of the century. Assuming no adaptation, 
the region as a whole faces likely yield declines of up to 
19% by mid-century and 63% by the end of the century.
Yet while the agricultural industry will clearly be affected 
by climate change, it is also probably the best equipped 
to manage these risks. Farmers have always adapted to 
changing weather and climate conditions, with adap-
tation and flexibility built into their business models. 
Armed with the right information, Midwest farmers can, 
and will, mitigate some of these impacts through double- 
and triple-cropping, seed modification, crop switching 
and other adaptive practices. In many cases, crop 
production will likely shift from the Midwest to the Upper 
Great Plains, Northwest, and Canada, helping to keep the 
U.S. and global food system well supplied. However, this 
shift could put individual Midwest farmers and farm com-
munities at risk if production moves to cooler climates.
The projected increase in Midwest surface air tempera-
tures won’t just affect the health of the region’s crops; 
it will also put the region’s residents at risk. Over the 
past 40 years, the Midwest experienced only 2.7 days 
on average over 95°F. If we stay on our current climate 
path, the average Midwest resident will likely experi-
ence an additional 7 to 26 days above 95°F each year 
by mid-century, and 20 to 75 additional extreme-heat 




MIDWEST: AVERAGE SUMMER TEMPERATURE BY 2100 & KEY IMPACTS
Mortality: On 
our current path, 
by the end of the 
century, the average Midwest-
erner can expect to experience 2 
days in a typical year when the 
heat and humidity are so high 
that it will be unsafe to remain 
outdoors. Agriculture: Midwestern agricultural 
production is adapted to current climate 
conditions. Extreme heat will test the 
limits of crop innovations, and may result in reduced 
crop yields—unless farmers employ new adaptive 
practices.1009589 92 11086838077747050
Average Summer Temperature (°F)
Data Source: Rhodium Group
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MIDWEST
Figure 9: Humid Heat Stroke Index






































days—potentially more than 2 additional months per 
year of extreme heat—by the end of the century. On the 
other hand, the region will also experience fewer winter 
days with temperatures below freezing. 
But the real story in this region is the combined impact 
of heat and humidity, which we measure using the 
Humid Heat Stroke Index, or HHSI. The human body’s 
capacity to cool down in the hottest weather depends 
on our ability to sweat, and to have that sweat evaporate 
on our skin. Sweat keeps the skin temperature below 
95°F, which is required for our core temperature to 
stay around 98.6°F. But if the outside temperature is a 
combination of very hot and very humid—if it reaches a 
HHSI of about 95°F—our sweat cannot evaporate, and 
our core body temperature can rise until we actually 
collapse from heat stroke. Even at an HHSI of 92°F, core 
body temperatures can get close to 104°F, which is the 
body’s absolute limit. 
To date, the U.S. has never experienced heat-plus-humid-
ity at this scale. The closest this country has come was 
in 1995 in Appleton, Wisconsin, when the HHSI hit 92°F. 
(At the time, the outside temperature was 101°F and the 
dew point was 90°F.) The only place in the world that has 
ever reached the unbearable HHSI of 95°F was Dhahran, 
Saudi Arabia, in 2003 (outside temperature of 108°F, dew 
point of 95°F). Our research shows that if we continue on 
our current path, the average Midwesterner could see 
an HHSI at the dangerous level of 95°F two days every 
year by late century, and that by the middle of the next 
century, she or he can expect to experience 20 full days 
in a typical year of HHSI over 95°F, during which it will be 




The Great Plains region stretches from 
the far north (Montana) to the far South 
(Texas). Climate impacts will be felt very 
differently in the northern and southern 
parts of this region. 
In the southern states of the Great Plains region (Texas, 
Oklahoma, and Kansas), our research shows an increase 
in extremely hot days. The average resident of these 
states experienced 39 days per year over 95°F in the 
past 30 years. This number will likely increase by 28 to 60 
additional extremely hot days by mid-century and 60 to 
114  days per year by the end of the century—for a total 
of between three and four months of additional extreme 
hot days per year.
At the same time, the northern parts of the region will 
likely see a significant decrease in extremely cold days: 
from the average of 159 days per year of below-freezing 
weather over the past 30 years, to between 117 and 143 
freezing days at mid-century, and between 79 and 122 
freezing days by the end of the century. 
The southern and coastal parts of this region will also 
experience the sea level rise impacts on coastal 
communities that we’ve already discussed. In Texas, 
for instance, where about one-third of the state’s GDP is 
generated in coastal counties, sea levels will likely rise by 
1.5 to 2 feet by mid-century and 3.2 to 4.9 feet by the end 
of the century, with a 1-in-100 chance of a 7.0-foot rise. 
Though the north and south sub-regions of the Great 
Plains have starkly different climates, all the states in this 
region rely on two important climate-sensitive industries: 
agriculture and energy. 
Altogether, 80% of the region is devoted to cropland, 
pastures, and range land, which produce $92 billion in 
agricultural products each year. The story for the region’s 
agricultural sector is mixed: The more southern states 
may see declining crop yields as temperatures continue 
to rise, while the northern states may actually see yield 
gains, though this will depend on a number of factors, 
including water availability. (See the Southwest section 
for a more detailed discussion of this factor.)
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GREAT PLAINS
GREAT PLAINS: AVERAGE SUMMER TEMPERATURE BY 2100 & KEY IMPACTS
Energy: The largest increases in 
electricity consumption occur in the 
Great Plains region, with electricity 
demand likely growing by up to 6% over the 
next 5 to 25 years in Oklahoma. By mid-century, 
climate-driven changes in air conditioning use will 
likely result in a 3.4% to 9.2% increase in electric-
ity demand in Texas and a 3.1% to 8.4% increase 
for the Great Plains region as a whole.
Agriculture: The 
southernmost states 
may see declining 
crop yields as temperatures con-
tinue to rise, while the northern 
states may see yield gains.
Sea Level Rise: 
The southern and 
coastal parts of this 
region will experience sea level rise 
impacts on coastal communities. 
In Texas, sea levels will likely rise 
by 3.2 to 4.9 feet by 2100. 
1009589 92 11086838077747050
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At the same time, the region is a major energy producer 
for the nation, making climate impacts on the energy 
sector particularly important for this area. Texas and 
Wyoming alone produce half of U.S. energy (primarily 
from crude oil and natural gas in Texas and coal in 
Wyoming), and North Dakota has recently become a 
major oil and gas producer. Power generation facilities 
in the region currently meet about 17% of the nation’s 
overall electricity needs.19
If we stay on our current path, our research shows a 
significant increase in demand for air conditioning over 
the course of the century which, when combined with 
other heat-related impacts such as reductions in power 
generation and in transmission efficiency and reliability, 
could place a considerable burden on the electricity 
power sector. As soon as 5 to 25 years from now, our 
research shows a 0.8% to 2.2% likely increase in nation-
wide electricity consumption. The country will likely see 
a roughly corresponding decline in demand for heating, 
as temperatures warm up in the northern states, but 
the switch from natural gas and fuel oil-driven heating 
demand to electricity powered cooling demand has 
significant implications for the U.S. energy system. 
The largest increases in electricity consumption occur in the 
Great Plains region, with likely electricity demand growth 
in Texas and Oklahoma of up to 5% and 6% respectively 
over the next 5 to 25 years. By mid-century, climate-driven 
changes in air conditioning will likely result in a 3.4% to 
9.2% increase in electricity demand in Texas and a 3.1% to 
8.4% increase for the Great Plains region as a whole. 
GREAT PLAINS
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Most of this increase will occur during times of the day 
when electricity consumption is already high. Meeting 
higher peak demand will likely require the construction 
of up to 95 GW of additional power generation capacity 
over the next 5 to 25 years, the rough equivalent of 
200 average-size coal or natural gas power plants. 
Constructing these new power-generation facilities will, 
in turn, raise residential and commercial energy prices. 
Our research concludes that climate-driven changes in 
heating and cooling will likely increase annual residential 
and commercial energy costs nationally by $474 million 
to $12 billion over the next 5 to 25 years and $8.5 billion 
to $30 billion by the middle of the century.
GREAT PLAINS
All of this could have a significant impact on the econo-
my of the Great Plains. In addition, many of the region’s 
current energy-production facilities—from power plants 
to oil and gas platforms—are at risk from climate-driv-
en increases in storm surge and potential changes in 
hurricane activity. If these facilities are flooded, the 
region will lose electricity and energy resources just as 
the country’s need for them is growing. 
Shipping cranes at the Port of Houston
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The Pacific Northwest is a good example 
of the general truth that similar climate 
impacts may be felt differently from one 
region to another. 
For example, by mid-century this area will have 
fewer additional extremely hot days than, say, the 
Southeast—but the average Northwest resident will 
likely go from experiencing only 5 days of 95°F or 
warmer temperatures per year on average for the past 
30 years to an additional 7 to 15 extremely hot days by 
mid-century, and to an additional 18 to 41 extremely 
hot days by the end of the century. This represents 
an increase of 3 to 8 times the number of hot days for 
the region per year, which is a significant change from 
historic norms. 
This region is also coastal, but the extent of expected 
sea level rise here is more varied than the east coast. 
Because the area is relatively close to the Alaskan 
glaciers, the Earth’s gravitational field may lead to 
the ice melt in Alaska actually lowering sea levels 
off Washington and Oregon. At the same time, West 
Antarctic melt may lead to higher sea level rise in the 
Northwest over the long term. This latter effect is 
captured in our analysis of the “tail risk” of sea level rise 
in the Northwest. Overall, our research shows that if we 
stay on our current path, sea level at Seattle will likely 
rise by 0.6 to 1.3 feet between 2000 and 2050 and by 
1.6 to 3.0 feet between 2000 and 2100. Looking out to 
the tail risks, though, there is a 1-in-100 chance of up to 
5 feet of sea level rise by 2100 in Seattle.
The economy of the Northwest is dependent on its 
coastlines, but it is also heavily dependent on its forests. 
Oregon and Washington are the number one and two 
softwood-producing states in the nation, respectively;20 
these two states plus Idaho produce more than $11 
billion in primary wood product sales.21 Our review of 
existing research suggests the Northwest’s forests will 
experience significant potential impacts from climate 
change, in particular from wildfire—due to both in-
creased drought and to wood damage from pests surviv-
ing warmer winters. One study we reviewed found that if 
temperatures rise 3.2°F by mid-century, this could lead to 
54% increase in the annual area burned in the western U. 
S.
22
 The same study found that the forests of the Pacific 
Northwest and Rocky Mountains will likely experience the 




Heat : The average Northwest resident will 
likely go from experiencing only 5 days of 95°F 
or warmer temperatures per year on average 
for the past 30 years to an additional 18 to 41 extremely 
hot days by the end of the century.
NORTHWEST
NORTHWEST: AVERAGE SUMMER TEMPERATURE BY 2100 & KEY IMPACTS
Sea Level Rise: If we stay on our current path, sea 
level at Seattle will likely rise by 0.6 to 1.0 feet by 
mid-century and by 1.6 to 3.0 feet by 2100. Looking 
out to the tail risks, though, there is a 1-in-100 chance of up to 5 
feet of sea level rise in Seattle by the end of the century. 
1009589 92 11086838077747050
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SOUTHWEST
The Southwest region includes the tra-
ditional Southwest states—Arizona, Col-
orado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah—and 
also California. As such, it is an extremely 
diverse region that in some ways serves 
as a microcosm of all the climate impacts 
we’ve discussed so far. 
This region is already warm and dry—about 40% of this 
area is covered by desert23—and is likely to become 
more so in the coming decades. Over the past 30 years, 
the average Southwest resident experienced 40 days 
per year of temperatures of 95°F or more. If we con-
tinue on our current path, by mid-century the average 
Southwest resident will likely see 13 to 28 additional 
extremely hot days. By the end of the century, this 
number will likely rise to an additional 33 to 70 days of 
extreme heat due to climate change. That translates to 
one to two additional months of days over 95°F each 
year within the lifetime of babies being born right now 
in this region—one of the fastest-growing in the United 
States. 
Because it includes California, the Southwest is not just 
one big desert; it is also an extremely coastal region. 
Eighty-seven percent of all Californians live in coastal 
counties, and 80% of the state’s GDP is derived from 
those counties. Along the coastline of San Diego, if we 
continue on our current path, sea level will likely rise 
by 0.7 to 1.2 feet before the middle of the century, and 
by 1.9 to 3.3 feet by the end of the century. But the real 
sea level risk in this region is in the tails. The California 
coastline is more exposed to sea level rise resulting from 
Antarctic melt than the global average, and there is a 
1-in-100 chance that sea levels could rise by as much as 
5.5 feet by 2100 in San Diego. 
San Diego is of strategic importance to the U.S. military: 
The city is home to three Marine installations, including 
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, three naval bases, 
and a Coast Guard station. Fortunately, the military is one 
of our country’s leading institutions in terms of acknowl-
edging the potential impact of climate risk on its instal-
lations here and throughout the U. S. The Department 
of Defense’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called 
for a climate impact assessment at all DOD’s permanent 




SOUTHWEST: AVERAGE SUMMER TEMPERATURE BY 2100 & KEY IMPACTS
Heat:  On our current path, by the 
end of the century, the average South-
west resident will likely experience an 
additional 33 to 70 days of extreme heat due to 
climate change, or nearly four additional months 
of days over 95°F each year.
Sea Level Rise: 87% of all Californians live 
in coastal counties, and 80% of the state’s 
GDP is derived from those counties. Along 
the coastline of San Diego, if we continue on our current 
path, sea level will likely rise by 1.9 to 3.4 feet by 2100.
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In part because of tectonic plate activity in California, sea 
level rise will vary across the state: Los Angeles (1.5 to 2.9 
feet by 2100), Santa Monica (1.7 to 3.1 feet by 2100), and 
San Francisco (1.8 to 3.2 feet by 2100) will likely see lower 
rise than San Diego. 
While extreme heat days in the Midwest and Southeast 
will likely be coupled with high humidity, here in the 
Southwest the days will likely be hot and dry, increasing 
the potential of wildfires and drying up water sources. 
While we did not quantify the impact of climate change 
on either forestry or water availability, these are signifi-
cant climate risks in the Southwest region, and both are 
ripe for further analysis. 
As the Southwest climate heats up, the region is likely to 
see significantly less snow in the mountains, leading to 
decreases in spring runoff especially in California and the 
Southern Rockies. Extreme heat may also lead to higher 
evaporation of existing reservoirs. This translates into 
less available groundwater for critical industries such as 
agriculture, as well as for simple drinking and bathing. 
Even as temperatures rise, increased energy demand 
from air conditioning will likely lead to increased water 
demand, since electricity generation is heavily water-de-
pendent. Decreased water availability is also likely to be 
the most significant impact on this region’s agricultural 
industries, which tend to be non-commodity crops (tree 
nuts, fruits, etc.) and therefore are not included in our 
quantitative analysis of the agricultural sector. 
SOUTHWEST
”
“A broad range of issues impact real estate, construction, and urban development.  Obviously coastal inundation is one of those. Another is the implication of extreme weather events even within the internal parts of the country. . . . Some of the most water scarce ar-
eas of the country are due to get less precipitation. Areas that are dry are going to get drier. 
And that has immense implications for cites in the west.






Alaska is ground zero for U.S. climate 
impacts. The state relies heavily on three 
climate-sensitive commodities: oil and 
gas, minerals, and seafood. 
More than 80% of the state’s GDP comes from oil and 
gas production, and so increases in energy demand (as 
discussed above) will dramatically affect this region. 
Meanwhile, fisheries and tourism, the third and fourth 
largest contributors to the Alaska economy, depend on 
healthy oceans and coastal ecosystems. 
Our research shows major climactic changes in Alaska 
over this century. If we continue on our current path, by 
mid-century Alaska’s average temperature will likely rise 
to between 4.5°F to 8.0°F warmer than it has been over 
the past forty years. By the end of the century, tempera-
tures will likely rise by 7.6°F to 16°F, but there is a 1-in-20 
chance that they will rise even higher, by as much as 
21°F. The bulk of this warming is likely to happen in the 
winter months, significantly decreasing the number of 
extremely cold days that Alaska now experiences. Up 
until 2010, Alaska experienced about 188 days per year 
below freezing; our current path will likely decrease these 
freezing days by 14% to 25% by mid-century, and by 30% 
to 50% by the end of this century. 
The state is heavily coastal: 84% of Alaskans live in coastal 
counties, and 86% of the state’s GDP comes from these 
counties. Sea level is variable around the state, due to the 
proximity of the glaciers and to shifting tectonic plates. 
As in the Pacific Northwest, the state may actually see sea 
levels go down over the course of this century: Our re-
search shows that sea level at Juneau will likely fall by 1.6 
to 2.0 feet between 2000 and 2050 and by 2.4 to 3.5 feet 
between 2000 and 2100. On the other hand, Anchorage 
will likely experience between a 0.6 feet sea level fall and 
a 1.2 feet sea level rise by the end of the century, with a 
1-in-100 chance of a 3.2 foot rise. Prudhoe Bay is likely to 
experience 2.1 feet to 3.8 feet of sea level rise by 2100, 
with a 1-in-100 chance of a 6.6 foot rise.




As Alaska is at the center of climate  
impacts from melting ice, Hawaii is at the 
center of impacts from sea level rise. This 
state is 100% coastal in both its population 
and GDP.
Hawaii is expected to get significantly warmer: On our 
current path, by mid-century average temperatures will 
likely be between 1.6°F to 3.6°F warmer than tempera-
tures over the past 40 years. By the end of the century, 
temperatures will likely increase between 3.9 and 7.7°F. 
There is also a small but not insignificant chance that 
Hawaii’s average temperatures could rise as much as 
10°F by the end of the century. 
Sea level rise in Hawaii is greater than the global average, 
and the extreme dependence of this state on the coasts 
will only intensify this impact. If we continue on our 
current path, sea level rise at Honolulu is likely 0.8 inches 
to 1.2 feet greater by mid-century, and 2.1 to 3.7 feet by 
the end of the century. Looking out at the 1-in-100 tail 
risk, sea level at Honolulu could rise by as much as 6.1 
feet by 2100.
Hawaii cannot reasonably be looked at as a stand-alone 
region, however: This state imports the vast majority of 
its food and energy, and is interdependent with the rest 
of the U. S. as well as the rest of the world. The recent 
tsunami in Japan and typhoon in the Philippines have 
awakened many businesses to the impact of a changing 
climate on global supply chains,
26
 and ultra-dependent 
regions like Hawaii are by necessity very sensitive to 
these realities. Changing agricultural yields on the main-
land may have a significant effect on Hawaii in terms of 
food cost and availability. Similarly, higher energy costs in 
the continental U.S. are likely to drive the cost of import-
ed energy even higher for Hawaii. The state is pushing 
forward to diversify its energy resources and rely more 
on domestic renewable sources; however, most of these 
installations are along the vulnerable coastlines. 
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“I think we have to begin by recognizing the reality and 
severity of this threat to our economies, both United 
States and globally, and really to life on earth more 
broadly as we know it. We also have to recognize that 
this problem needs to be dealt with now. We cannot 
wait because greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
once they’re there, remain there for centuries so that 
every year is greater and more severe in terms of 
greenhouse gas emissions cumulatively than had been 
the case the year before. ” 
— Risk Committee member Robert E. Rubin27
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Taking a classic risk assessment approach to climate 
change in the U.S. leads to the inescapable conclusion 
that if we continue on our current climate path, the 
nation faces multiple risks across every region. 
But risk assessment is not just about identifying risks and 
leaving it at that. Our research also shows that if we act 
today to move onto a different path, we can still avoid many 
of the worst impacts of climate change, particularly those 
related to extreme heat. We are fully capable of managing 
climate risk, just as we manage risk in many other areas of 
our economy and national security—but only if we start to 
change our business and public policy decisions today. 
The Risky Business Project was not designed to dictate a 
single response to climate risk. We know that there will 
be a diversity of responses to our analysis depending on 
the particular risk tolerance of individual business and 
policy actors, as well as their particular region or sector 
of the economy. But the Risk Committee does believe, 
based on this project’s independent research and the 
significance of the climate risks it demonstrates, that it is 
time for all American business leaders and investors to 
get in the game and rise to the challenge of addressing 
climate change. The fact is that just as the investments and 
economic choices we made over the past several decades 
have increased our current vulnerability to climate change, 
so will the choices we make today determine what our 
nation looks like in 15 years, at mid-century, and by 2100. 
In short, we have a choice whether we accept the climate 
risks laid out above or whether we get on another path. 
This is not a problem for another day. The invest-
ments we make today—this week, this month, this 
year—will determine our economic future. 




If we were told—in any sphere—that we had at least a 90% 
chance of averting a disaster through changes we ourselves 
could make, wouldn’t we take action?
— Risk Committee member Olympia Snowe28
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NEXT STEPS
Changing everyday business practices to  
become more resilient. 
Some of the climate impacts we analyzed are 
already being felt across the nation; indeed, some 
are already an unalterable part of our economic 
future. Rational business actors must adapt. The 
agricultural sector is on the front lines of climate 
adaptation. As Risk Committee member Greg Page 
has noted, “Farmers are innovators and consum-
mate optimizers. . . . They persistently demonstrate 
the ability to adapt to changes in the environment 
and successfully adopt new technologies.” 29 In 
coastal communities, too, private and public sector 
decision-makers are beginning to adapt to present 
climate impacts, building sea walls and changing 
building codes to recognize the reality of rising sea 
levels and increased storm surge. 
But this adaptation may come at a price: Some 
farmers in Midwest counties, for instance, may 
BUSINESS ADAPTATION 
suffer economic losses shifting to new crops (with 
required new equipment and expertise), if they can 
afford to shift at all. Meanwhile, coastal states and 
cities are being forced to adapt to climate realities 
without adequate financial support from the federal 
government. 30 These public sector adaptation costs 
will only grow as the private insurance industry con-
tinues its exodus from the business of insuring coastal 
real estate and the bond market begins to wake up to 
the vulnerability of key infrastructure investments to 
climate change. 31 As Donna Shalala, President of the 
University of Miami and Risk Committee member, has 
noted , “People in Florida really have thought through 
some of the consequences . . . to the extent that they 
can do some things themselves through their local 
governments, through the state, they certainly have 
stepped up to do many of those things . . . but it’s not 
enough. This is going to take a national investment.” 32 
There are three general areas of action that can help to minimize the risks U.S. busi-
nesses currently face from climate change: 
Incorporating risk assessment into capital 
expenditures and balance sheets. 
Another area where today’s business investments 
have a direct relationship to tomorrow’s climate 
impacts is in long-term capital expenditures, 
which will live well into the middle of the century 
and beyond. Today, ratings agencies are evaluat-
ing infrastructure projects with a multi-decade 
lifespan. Utilities are making investments in new 
power plants and pipelines, and signing long-term 
power purchase agreements that rely on those 
investments. And real estate investors are making 
multiple bets on residential and commercial proper-
ties. These investments must be evaluated in terms 
of the actual climate risk specific regions face as we 
approach the middle of this century. In 2010, rec-
ognizing this reality, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued Interpretive Guidance on 
climate disclosure, giving companies some idea of 
how to consider their “material” risks from climate 
change; unfortunately, as of 2013, over 40% of com-
panies listed on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index were 




Instituting policies to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change. 
Ultimately, climate change is not just an issue for 
specific sectors and regions: It is a global issue that 
demands an effective policy response from the U.S. 
According to the latest Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change report, the world may have as 
little as 15 years to “keep planetary warming to 
a tolerable level,” through an aggressive push to 
bring down carbon emissions. 34
In the Risky Business Project, we focused primarily 
on modeling our current economic path and the 
attendant climate risks. Because this is the path 
we’re now following as a nation, we need to better 
understand the potential risks it poses and decide 
how to respond to those risks—especially those 
that are already embedded in our economy be-
cause of decisions we made decades ago. 
But the path we’re on today does not have to be the 
path we choose to follow tomorrow. Our analysis 
also looks at alternate pathways that include invest-
ments in adaptation and policy efforts to mitigate 
climate change through lowering greenhouse gas 
emissions. These alternate pathways could signifi-
cantly change the climate impacts we discuss above. 
For example, modest global emission reductions can 
avoid up to 80% of projected economic costs result-
ing from increased heat-related mortality and energy 
demand.
Our goal in this risk assessment is not to dictate 
those policy pathways. However, we do strongly urge 
the American business community to play an active 
role in the public discussion around climate mitiga-
tion and preparedness, which we believe is the single 
most effective way for businesses to decrease the 
risks we have identified in this project. 
PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE
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FROM RISK ASSESSMENT TO RISK MANAGEMENT: NEXT STEPS
With this project, we have attempted to provide a 
common language for how to think about climate risk— 
built upon a common language of risk that is already 
part of every serious business and investment decision 
we make today. If we have a common, serious, non-par-
tisan language describing the risks our nation may face 
from climate change, we can use it as the springboard 
for a serious, non-partisan discussion of the potential 
actions we can take to reduce those risks. 
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CONCLUSION
When Risk Committee member George Shultz was 
serving as President Reagan’s Secretary of State in 1987, 
he urged the President to take action on that decade’s 
hotly-contested scientific issue: the ozone layer. As Shultz 
later said in an interview with Scientific American, “Rather 
than go and confront the people who were doubting it 
and have a big argument with them, we’d say to them: 
Look, there must be, in the back of your mind, at least a 
little doubt. You might be wrong, so let’s all get together 
on an insurance policy.” 35 That insurance policy became 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, an international treaty still in effect to this 
day.
Our goal with the Risky Business Project is not to 
confront the doubters. Rather, it is to bring American 
business and government—doubters and believers 
alike—together to look squarely at the potential risks 
posed by climate change, and to consider whether it’s 
time to take out an insurance policy of our own. 
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